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Plaintiffs-Appellants Tamara Fields, on behalf of herself and as a
representative of the Estate of Lloyd Fields, Jr., Heather Creach, on behalf of
herself and as a representative of the Estate of James Damon Creach, J.C. (1), a
minor, and J.C. (2), a minor (“Plaintiffs-Appellants” or “Appellants”) appeal from
the Judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California (Hon. William H. Orrick) entered on November 18, 2016, and reflected
in an Order of that same day, in which the District Court granted with prejudice the
Motion To Dismiss of Defendant-Appellee Twitter, Inc. (“Twitter” or “DefendantAppellee”). See Appellants’ Excerpts of Record (“AER”) at 7-26. Because the
District Court erred in granting the Motion To Dismiss, this Court should reverse
the District Court’s Order and Judgment.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs-Appellants are the surviving family members of Lloyd “Carl”
Fields, Jr. and James Damon Creach, two United States citizens killed by an ISIS 1
operative in Amman, Jordan on November 9, 2015. They seek to hold Twitter
responsible for knowingly providing material support to ISIS in violation of the
Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2331 et seq. (“ATA”).
That Twitter violated the ATA is essentially beyond dispute; it is a matter of
1

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) is also known as the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant (“ISIL”), the Islamic State (“IS”), ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fīlʿIrāq wash-Shām (“DAESH”) and al-Qaeda in Iraq (“AQI”).
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public record that Defendant-Appellee provided ISIS with material support in the
form of Twitter accounts and did so knowingly and/or recklessly. Nevertheless,
the District Court held that Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claims are barred pursuant to the
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“CDA”) because they
seek to treat Twitter liable as a publisher. This decision was made in error.
Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claims are not premised on the dissemination of offensive
user-generated content, but rather the provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS in the
first place. Indeed, Plaintiffs-Appellants’ allegations do not rely on user-generated
content at all except for purposes of demonstrating causation, and that is not
sufficient to invoke the protections of the CDA. Nor can the provision of Twitter
accounts itself be deemed publishing activity given that such activity is contentneutral. The CDA also does not bar Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claims insofar as they
are based on private communications that were not published.
The District Court also dismissed Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claims for failing to
adequately allege proximate causation. This too was in error. The District Court
focused on the lack of an alleged direct connection between the provision of
Twitter accounts to ISIS and the November 9, 2015 attack, but proximate causation
under the ATA has no “directness” requirement. This is because material support
to terrorists is fungible: any type of support can help a terrorist organization carry
out additional attacks. Accordingly, Plaintiffs-Appellants adequately alleged
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proximate causation because they claimed that (1) Twitter provided material
support to ISIS, and (2) ISIS shortly thereafter carried out a terrorist attack in
which one of its operatives killed Mr. Fields and Mr. Creach. Courts interpreting
the ATA have not required anything more.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
(Fed. R. App. P. 28; Ninth Circuit Rule 28-2.2)
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1331 and 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) as a civil action brought by a citizen of the United
States injured by reason of an act of international terrorism and the estate, survivor,
or heir of a United States citizen injured by reason of an act of international
terrorism. AER at 28.
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter because PlaintiffsAppellants are appealing a final decision of the District Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Plaintiffs-Appellants timely appealed on November 23, 2016 from the
District Court’s final Order and Judgment of November 18, 2016, which disposed
of all of their claims. AER at 7-26.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
(Fed. R. App. P. 28; Ninth Circuit Rule 28-2.5)
(1)

Issue: Whether a theory of liability based on the provision of Twitter
accounts to a designated terrorist organization seeks to treat the defendant as
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a “publisher” for purposes of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. §
230(c).
Standard Of Review: “[The Ninth Circuit] review[s] de novo the district
court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, construing all facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.” Zinni v. Jackson White, PC, 2014 WL
1101222, at *1 (9th Cir. 2014).
(2)

Issue: Whether a theory of liability based on the provision of private
messaging tools to a designated terrorist organization seeks to treat the
defendant as a “publisher” for purposes of the Communications Decency
Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
Standard Of Review: “[The Ninth Circuit] review[s] de novo the district
court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, construing all facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.” Zinni v. Jackson White, PC, 2014 WL
1101222, at *1 (9th Cir. 2014).

(3)

Issue: Whether the lower court erred in holding that Plaintiffs-Appellants
failed to adequately allege proximate causation.
Standard Of Review: “[The Ninth Circuit] review[s] de novo the district
court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, construing all facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.” Zinni v. Jackson White, PC, 2014 WL
1101222, at *1 (9th Cir. 2014).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(Fed. R. App. P. 28)
For years, Twitter knowingly and/or recklessly provided ISIS with accounts
on its social network. AER at 28. Through this provision of material support,
Twitter enabled ISIS to acquire the resources needed to carry out numerous
terrorist attacks. Id. One of these terrorist attacks took place on November 9, 2015
when an ISIS operative in Amman, Jordan shot and killed Lloyd “Carl” Fields, Jr.
and James Damon Creach. Id.
I.

TWITTER PROVIDED ACCOUNTS TO ISIS
ISIS was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (“FTO”) under

Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, on December 17,
2004. Id. at 30. Since its emergence in Iraq in the early 2000s, when it was known
as AQI, ISIS has wielded increasing territorial power, applying brutal, terrifying
violence to attain its military and political goals, including summary executions,
mass beheadings, amputations, shootings and crucifixions. Id. at 29-30.
Originally affiliated with al Qaeda, ISIS’s stated goal is the establishment of a
transnational Islamic caliphate, i.e. an Islamic state run under strict Sharia law. Id.
at 29. By February 2014, however, ISIS’s tactics had become too extreme for even
al Qaeda and the two organizations separated. Id.
Despite all this, Twitter has provided ISIS with dozens of accounts on its
social network since 2010. Id. at 29-30. For years, Twitter permitted ISIS to
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maintain its official accounts unfettered and, until recently, the number of ISIS
accounts on Twitter grew at an astonishing rate. Id at 29. These official accounts
included media outlets, regional hubs and well-known ISIS members, some with
tens of thousands of followers. Id. For example, Twitter permitted Al-Furqan,
ISIS’s official media arm, to maintain an account with 19,000 followers. Id.
Likewise, Al-Hayat Media Center, ISIS’s official public relations group,
maintained at least a half dozen accounts. Id. As of June 2014, Al-Hayat had
nearly 20,000 followers. Another Twitter account, @ISIS_Media_Hub, had 8,954
followers as of September 2014. Id. As of December 2014, ISIS had an estimated
70,000 Twitter accounts, at least 79 of which were “official.” Id.
II.

TWITTER PROVIDED DIRECT MESSAGING CAPABILITIES TO
ISIS
Twitter also provided material support to ISIS in the form of direct

messaging capabilities, which ISIS often used to attract recruits from Western
countries. Id. at 33-34. As described by Defendant-Appellee, “Direct Messages
are the private side of Twitter. . . . Communicate quickly and privately with one
person or many. Direct Messages support text, photos, links, emoji and Tweets, so
you can make your point however you please. . . . Have a private conversation
with anyone on Twitter, even a friend of a friend. Direct messages can only be
seen between the people included.” Id.
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These Direct Messages are “extensively monitored by [ISIS’s] emirs and
supervisors of the recruiting unit.” Id. at 34. According to FBI Director James
Comey, “[o]ne of the challenges in facing this hydra-headed monster is that if
(ISIS) finds someone online, someone who might be willing to travel or kill . . .
they will begin a [T]witter direct messaging contact.” Id. Indeed, according to the
Brookings Institution, some ISIS members “use Twitter purely for private
messaging or covert signaling.” Id. ISIS has also been known to use Twitter’s
Direct Messaging capabilities for fundraising and operational purposes. Id.
Twitter’s Direct Messaging capabilities also permit ISIS operatives to
receive private communications without ever issuing a single tweet. Id. Through
its Direct Messaging tool, Twitter enables ISIS members to receive private Direct
Messages from potential recruits, terrorist financiers and other terrorists with
operational and intelligence information. Id. Giving ISIS the capability to send
and receive Direct Messages in this manner is no different than handing it a
satellite phone, walkie-talkies or the use of a mail drop, all of which terrorists use
for private communications in order to further their extremist agendas. Id.
III.

TWITTER ACTED KNOWINGLY AND RECKLESSLY
For years, the media has reported on the use of Twitter by ISIS and other

terrorist groups:
• In December 2011, the New York Times reported that the terrorist
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group al-Shabaab, “best known for chopping off hands and starving
their own people, just opened a Twitter account.” Id. at 30.
• That same month, terrorism experts cautioned that “Twitter terrorism”
was part of “an emerging trend” and that several branches of al Qaeda
were using Twitter. Id.
• On August 18, 2013, USA Today reported on “the Twitter feed of
pro-Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS).” Id.
• On October 14, 2013, the BBC issued a report on “The Sympatic,”
“one of the most important spokesmen of the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant on the social contact website Twitter.” Id.
• On October 31, 2013, Agence France-Presse reported on ISIS
accounts on Twitter. Id.
• On June 19, 2014, CNN reported on ISIS’s use of Twitter. The next
day, Seth Jones, Associate Director at International Security and
Defense Policy Center, stated in an interview on CNN that Twitter
was widely used by terrorist groups like ISIS. Id.
• In September 2014, Time Magazine quoted terrorism expert Rita
Katz, who observed that, “[f]or several years, ISIS followers have
been hijacking Twitter . . . with very little to no interference at all. . . .
Twitter’s lack of action has resulted in a strong, and massive pro-ISIS
presence on their social media platform.” Id. at 30-31.
Throughout this period, both the U.S. government and the public at large
have urged Twitter to stop providing its services to terrorists.
• In December 2011, an Israeli law group threatened to file suit against
Twitter for allowing terrorist groups like Hezbollah to use its social
network in violation of U.S. anti-terrorism laws. Id. at 31.
• In December 2012, several members of Congress wrote to FBI
Director Robert Mueller asking the Bureau to demand that the Twitter
block the accounts of various terrorist groups. Id.
• In a committee hearing held on August 2, 2012, Rep. Ted Poe, chair
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of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, lamented
that “when it comes to a terrorist using Twitter, Twitter has not shut
down or suspended a single account.” “Terrorists are using Twitter,”
Rep. Poe added, and “[i]t seems like it’s a violation of the law.” In
2015, Rep. Poe again reported that Twitter had consistently failed to
respond sufficiently to pleas to shut down clear incitements to
violence by terrorists. Id.
• Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has urged Twitter to
become more aggressive in preventing ISIS from using its network.
“Resolve means depriving jihadists of virtual territory, just as we
work to deprive them of actual territory,” she told one audience. Id.
• On January 7, 2016, White House officials announced that they would
hold high-level discussions with Twitter and other social media
companies to encourage them “to do more to block terrorists” from
using their services. “The primary purpose is for government officials
to press the biggest Internet firms to take a more proactive approach to
countering terrorist messages and recruitment online. . . . That issue
has long vexed U.S. counterterrorism officials . . . [b]ut the companies
have resisted some requests by law-enforcement leaders to take action
. . . .” Id.
Twitter responded to these public appeals by acknowledging that ISIS was using
its social network, but it nevertheless refused to act. Id. at 31-32.
IV.

TWITTER PROXIMATELY CAUSED PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS’
INJURIES
Without Twitter, the explosive growth of ISIS over the last few years into

the most-feared terrorist group in the world would not have been possible. Id. at
120. Twitter has played a key role in enabling ISIS to recruit new members,
fundraise millions of dollars and spread its propaganda. Id. at 33-38. Through
Twitter, ISIS was able to amass considerable resources that it used to carry out
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countless terrorist attacks. One of those attacks was the shooting of Lloyd “Carl”
Fields, Jr. and James Damon Creach.
Mr. Fields and Mr. Creach were former police officers who were training
law enforcement personnel at the International Police Training Center (“IPTC”) in
the Muwaqqar district of southeast Amman, Jordan. Id. at 39. On November 15,
2015, Anwar Abu Zaid, one of the men studying at the IPTC, entered the facility
smuggling a Kalashnikov assault rifle with 120 bullets and two handguns. Id. at
40-41. After the noontime prayer, Abu Zaid shot a truck that was moving through
the facility, killing Damon Creach. Id. at 41. Abu Zaid then entered the facility’s
cafeteria where he killed an additional four people eating lunch, including Carl
Fields. Id. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack in two separate statements.
Id. Israeli military intelligence later released a report stating that Abu Zaid was
part of a clandestine ISIS terror cell that was also responsible for a suicide attack
near Mosul, Iraq in 2015 and a shooting at the Sarona Market in Tel Aviv. Id.
V.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A.

The Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2331 et seq.

The ATA prohibits intentionally, knowingly or recklessly providing any
type of “material support or resources” to terrorists, including “any property,
tangible or intangible, or service” such as “communications equipment.” 18
U.S.C. §§ 2339A(b)(1); 2339B(g)(4). Congress purposefully defined “material

10

support or resources” in a broad fashion because providing any assistance to
terrorists frees up resources that they can use for their criminal and violent
activities. Even the provision of seemingly benign services (like social network
accounts) bolsters a terrorist organization’s efficacy and strength in a community,
thus undermining this nation’s efforts to delegitimize and weaken these groups.
Anyone who violates the ATA’s criminal material support provisions may
be held liable under the statute’s private right of action, which provides the
following:
Any national of the United States injured in his or her
person, property, or business by reason of an act of
international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or
heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of
the United States and shall recover threefold the damages
he or she sustains and the cost of the suit, including
attorney’s fees.
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). The legislative history of the ATA’s civil remedy indicates
that it “was to be construed broadly,” and, in the words of Senator Grassley, the
bill’s co-sponsor, “it empowers victims with all the weapons available in civil
litigation.” Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Authority, 304 F.
Supp. 2d 232, 265 (D.R.I. 2004) (original emphasis).
B.

The Communications Decency Act Of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230

Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA provides the following:
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(c) Protection For “Good Samaritan” Blocking And
Screening Of Offensive Material
(1) Treatment Of Publisher Or Speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content
provider.
Separated into its elements, subsection (c)(1) precludes liability for “(1) a provider
or user of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under
a . . . cause of action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by
another information content provider.” Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096,
1100-01 (9th Cir. 2009) (footnote omitted). “Thus, section 230(c)(1) precludes
liability that treats a website as the publisher or speaker of information users
provide on the website. In general, this section protects websites from liability for
material posted on the website by someone else.” Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824
F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2016).
While the CDA bars claims that seek to treat defendants as a publisher or
speaker, it does not declare “a general immunity from liability deriving from thirdparty content.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100. Nor was it “meant to create a lawless
no-man’s-land on the Internet.” Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008). And “Congress has
not provided an all purpose get-out-of-jail-free card for businesses that publish user
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content on the internet, though any claims might have a marginal chilling effect on
internet publishing businesses.” Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 853.
VI.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff-Appellant Tamara Fields originally filed suit on January 13, 2016

and then filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on March 24, 2016 to add the
Creach family as additional plaintiffs. AER at 47. Defendant-Appellee moved to
dismiss the FAC on April 6, 2016 and that motion was granted on August 10, 2016
with leave to amend. Id. at 49, 51. Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a Second Amended
Complaint (“SAC”) on August 30, 2016, and Defendant-Appellee moved to
dismiss the SAC on September 13, 2016. Id. at 27, 51. Oral argument on that
motion was heard on November 9, 2016. Id. at 35. On November 18, 2016, the
District Court granted Defendant-Appellee’s motion to dismiss the SAC, dismissed
the case and a final judgment was entered. Id. at 7-26. Plaintiffs-Appellants filed
a Notice Of Appeal on November 23, 2016. Id. at 1.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
(Fed. R. App. P. 28)
The District Court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claims. First,
claims based on the provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS do not implicate the
protections of the CDA because they do not seek to hold Twitter liable as a
publisher or speaker of content. Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claims arise from Twitter’s
provision of social media accounts to ISIS, not editorial decisions about specific
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tweets. Plaintiffs-Appellants allege that Twitter knew that ISIS was using its social
network not through the content of tweets, but from entirely external sources.
Indeed, the contents of ISIS’s tweets are only referenced in the SAC for purposes
of alleging causation and thus do not implicate the CDA.
Second, Plaintiffs-Appellants’ private messaging theory of liability does not
implicate the CDA because it involves only private messages that were never
published. The CDA itself does not define the term “publisher,” and so its
ordinary meaning must be used: “one who disseminates information to the
public.” Because private messages are not published, the CDA does not apply to
claims that arise out of such messages. While the CDA may have been passed
with defamation law in mind—where information can be “published” to just one
person—the CDA itself does not contain any such definition.
Finally, the District Court incorrectly applied the standard for proximate
causation. Courts throughout the country have held that there is no “directness”
requirement for proximate causation under the ATA. Any provision of material
support to a terrorist organization facilitates its terrorist activities. Here, the
provision of Twitter accounts enabled ISIS to raise funds and recruit new
operatives which it used to carry out numerous terrorist attacks. One of those
attacks was the November 9, 2015 shooting in Amman, Jordan in which Mr. Fields
and Mr. Creach were killed. This is enough for proximate causation under the
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ATA.
ARGUMENT
(Fed. R. App. P. 28)
I.

ISSUE 1: A THEORY OF LIABILITY BASED ON THE PROVISION
OF TWITTER ACCOUNTS TO A DESIGNATED TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION DOES NOT SEEK TO TREAT THE DEFENDANT
AS A “PUBLISHER” FOR PURPOSES OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)
In its November 18, 2016 Order, the District Court held that Plaintiffs-

Appellants’ claims were barred by the CDA because: (1) “providing accounts to
ISIS is publishing activity, just like monitoring, reviewing and editing content,”
and (2) the allegations “at their core . . . are still that Twitter knowingly failed to
prevent ISIS from disseminating content through the Twitter platform, not its mere
provision of accounts to ISIS.” AER at 15, 17-18. Respectfully, these conclusions
are both erroneous. The decision to provide ISIS with a Twitter account is wholly
distinct from policing the content of ISIS’s tweets. Indeed, the account creation
process is antecedent to the issuing of tweets and entirely content-neutral. All
references to user-generated content in the SAC are limited to the issue of
causation and thus do not implicate the CDA.
A.

The Provision Of Social Media Accounts Is Not Publishing
Activity

For purposes of the CDA, “publication involves reviewing, editing, and
deciding whether to publish or to withdraw from publication third-party content.”
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Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009); id. (A publisher is one
who “reviews material submitted for publication, perhaps edits it for style or
technical fluency, and then decides whether to publish it.”); Doe v. Internet
Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 852 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Jane Doe’s failure to warn claim
has nothing to do with Internet Brands’ efforts, or lack thereof, to edit, monitor, or
remove user generated content.”).
Providing ISIS with Twitter accounts is not publishing activity under these
definitions because it does not involve reviewing, editing or deciding whether to
issue or withdraw tweets. Deciding whether someone can sign up for a Twitter
account is not the same thing as deciding what content can be published; handing
someone a tool is not the same thing as supervising the use of that tool. The CDA
bars claims based on the latter, but the theory of liability in this case is based solely
on the former. Twitter’s knowing provision of accounts to ISIS is itself a violation
of the ATA regardless of what content is issued from those accounts or whether
they are used to tweet at all. Social media account creation and content creation
are two distinct activities.
Nevertheless, the District Court reasoned that the provision of social media
accounts is akin to traditional publishing activities:
A policy that selectively prohibits ISIS members from
opening accounts would necessarily be content based as
Twitter could not possibly identify ISIS members without
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analyzing some speech, idea or content expressed by the
would-be account holder: i.e. “I am associated with
ISIS.” The decision to furnish accounts would be
content-neutral if Twitter made no attempt to distinguish
between users based on content – for example if they
prohibited everyone from obtaining an account, or they
prohibited every fifth person from obtaining an account.
But plaintiffs do not assert that Twitter should shut down
its entire site or impose an arbitrary, content-neutral
policy. Instead, they ask Twitter to specifically prohibit
ISIS members and affiliates from acquiring accounts – a
policy that necessarily targets the content, ideas, and
affiliations of particular account holders. There is
nothing content-neutral about such a policy.
AER at 16; id. (a decision based on a public user name is likewise a publishing
decision based on content). Respectfully, this analysis is flawed on several counts.
First, it does not accept as true the facts alleged in the SAC. Plaintiffs-Appellants
do not contend that Twitter’s knowledge was based on its review of tweets, or
usernames, or any other user-generated content found on its social media platform.
Rather, they allege that Twitter knew through numerous media reports and
communications from government officials that ISIS was using its social network.
Id. at 29-33.
Second, Plaintiffs-Appellants are asserting a content-neutral policy:
Twitter should not provide anyone with an account if it knows from external
sources that that person appears on the U.S. Treasury Department’s list of
Specially Designated Nationals And Blocked Persons. This distinction is status-
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based, not content-based. Indeed, this policy does not depend on the content of
tweets at all; it is a violation of the ATA to provide a Twitter account to a member
of a designated terrorist organization whether they use that account to spread
propaganda or to post knitting lessons. The District Court conflated content- and
status-based policies when it considered decisions based on “affiliations” as akin to
those based on the expression of “ideas.” But a status-based distinction has
nothing whatsoever to do with the content of tweets when knowledge is based on
external sources.
The District Court also held that, based on the decision in Jane Doe No. 1 v.
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016), “decisions about the structure
and operation of a website are content-based decisions.” AER at 17. But
Backpage is distinguishable. There, the plaintiff alleged that Backpage.com was
aiding human trafficking in the way that it constructed its website. The First
Circuit found that despite being framed as a claim about the structure and operation
of the site, the claim was really about what specific content would be published,
including whether phone numbers would be displayed, whether email addresses
would anonymized and whether photographs should have been stripped of their
metadata. Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 20. Accordingly, the focus of the claims
was really about what user-generated content could “appear on the website and in
what form.” Id. at 21; id. at 20 (“[S]ome of the challenged practices—most
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obviously, the choice of what words or phrases can be displayed on the site—are
traditional publisher functions under any coherent definition of the term.”).
Here, on the other hand, Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claims are not tied to usergenerated content in the same fashion. Indeed, apart from the causal chain, they
are not dependent on content at all. Whereas the claims in Backpage.com were
directly related to what user-generated content would appear and in what form, as
well as word choices and phrases, Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claims in this action are
not similarly tied to content. Creating an account on Twitter does not involve any
of these content-based decisions. Nor are Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claims based on
the structure and operation of Twitter.com; they do not claim that Twitter should
have built it website differently, but that it should not have knowingly provided
ISIS with access to accounts on the site at all. That was not the issue
Backpage.com.
B.

Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Allegations Are Not Content-Based

The District Court also held that Plaintiffs-Appellants’ provision of accounts
theory is barred by the CDA because “at their core, plaintiff’s allegations are still
that Twitter knowingly failed to prevent ISIS from disseminating content through
the Twitter platform, not its mere provision of accounts to ISIS.” AER at 17-18.
Respectfully, this decision was made in error. To the extent that user-generated
content is referenced at all in the SAC, it is solely for purposes of demonstrating
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causation. Under the precedent of this Court, references to content used solely for
purposes of alleging causation are not sufficient to invoke the protections of the
CDA.
All of the content-based allegations in the SAC are strictly limited to Section
III, titled “TWITTER PROXIMATELY CAUSED PLAINTIFFS’ INJURIES.”
AER at 33-38. Because this Court has repeatedly held that the CDA does not bar
claims simply because publishing activity is part of the causal analysis, these
references to ISIS’s tweets do not implicate Section 230.
In Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016), the plaintiff
brought a negligent failure to warn claim based on her allegation that defendant
knew rapists were using its website to lure victims. The Ninth Circuit ruled that
the CDA did not apply despite the fact that Internet Brands’ publishing activity
“could be described as a ‘but-for’ cause of [plaintiff’s] injuries.” Id. at 853.
Publishing activity is a but-for cause of just about
everything Model Mayhem is involved in. It is an
internet publishing business. Without publishing user
content, it would not exist. As noted above, however, we
held in Barnes that the CDA does not provide a general
immunity against all claims derived from third-party
content.
Id. Because the failure to warn claim did not depend on user-generated content
outside of the causal analysis, the CDA was not a bar to relief.
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.,
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570 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009). In that case, the plaintiff filed a promissory
estoppel claim against defendant Yahoo because she had relied on Yahoo’s
promise that it would remove private information and photographs that her exboyfriend had posted. Id. at 1098-99. Yahoo’s failure to remove the offensive
profile was a but-for cause of plaintiff’s injury “because without that posting the
plaintiff would not have suffered any injury. But that did not mean that the CDA
immunized the proprietor of the website from all potential liability.” Internet
Brands, 824 F.3d at 853. Even though the causal chain required reference to
published content, the CDA did not apply because the theory of liability was
otherwise not based on Yahoo’s publishing functions.
These cases stand for the proposition that where a theory of liability relies on
user-generated content purely for purposes of alleging causation, but otherwise
does not depend on content as a critical element, the CDA does not apply. Here,
Sections I and II of the SAC, which explain that Defendant-Appellee violated the
ATA because it knowingly and/or recklessly provided ISIS with Twitter accounts,
do not rely on or refer to user-generated content. AER at 29-33. Rather, all
references to content in the SAC are limited to allegations of causation. Id. at 3338. Under the law as stated in Internet Brands and Barnes, such references no not
give rise to immunity under the CDA.
The District Court distinguished Internet Brands and Barnes on the basis
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that those cases “involve[d] substantially different facts,” and, “[u]nlike those
cases,” Plaintiffs-Appellants’ “theory of liability is inherently tied to content.”
AER at 20. But the District Court’s attempt to differentiate the role of usergenerated content in this case from its use in Internet Brands and Barnes does not
hold up. Here, just like in Internet Brands and Barnes, content is referenced solely
for purposes of demonstrating causation and not for any other element of the
violations alleged. For instance, in Barnes, while Yahoo’s failure to remove the
offensive content caused the plaintiff’s injury, the cause of action arose not from
that content but from some other action—in that case, the creation of a contract.
Similarly, here, while ISIS was able to amass resources through tweets and direct
messages, the cause of action arises from the provision of the accounts in the first
place in violation of the ATA. Neither case is premised on user-generated content
in the way that a defamation case would be. Accordingly, Plaintiffs-Appellants’
theory of liability here is not “inherently tied to content” any more than it was in
Internet Brands and Barnes. While this case may not involve promissory estoppel
or a failure to warn, the underlying principle of Internet Brands and Barnes—that
references to content for purposes of causation alone do not implicate the CDA—
applies with equal force.
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C.

Barring Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Claims Would Not Further The
Goals Of The CDA

Barring Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claims in this case would not further the
purported goals of the CDA. First, in passing the CDA, “Congress wanted to
encourage the unfettered and unregulated development of free speech on the
Internet.” Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003); id. at 1033
(Congress was “concern[ed] with assuring a free market in ideas and information
on the Internet.”). But Congress surely did not intend to promote speech that aids
designated terrorist organizations. To the contrary, it expressly prohibited such
speech through the ATA’s material support provisions. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A-B
(defining “material support or resources” to include “training, expert advice” and
“communications equipment”). Numerous courts have held that that violations of
the ATA’s material support statutes do not implicate free speech concerns. See,
e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010) (the ATA’s
prohibition on providing material support to terrorists in the form of legal and
political advocacy training is constitutional because such a ban is necessary to
further the “[g]overnment’s interest in combating terrorism,” which “is an urgent
objective of the highest order”); Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1194
(9th Cir. 2014) (“There are, of course, certain types of speech that do not fall
within the protection of the First Amendment, such as . . . speech that materially
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assists a foreign terrorist organization.”); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v.
Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 166 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding “as other courts have,” that
“there is no First Amendment right nor any other constitutional right to support
terrorists”). Accordingly, nothing about the allegations in this lawsuit infringe
upon Congress’s goal of promoting free speech on the Internet. To the contrary,
barring Plaintiffs’ claims in this case would directly contradict the express
language of the ATA and expand the reach of the CDA far beyond its intended
purpose.
Nor would allowing this case to go forward have a “chilling effect” on
Internet free speech simply because it might “make operating an internet business
marginally more expensive.” Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 852. “Congress has not
provided an all purpose get out-of-jail-free card for businesses that publish user
content on the internet, though any claims might have a marginal chilling effect on
internet publishing businesses.” Id. at 824. Here, at most, liability would deter
interactive computer services from knowingly providing material support to
terrorists.
The District Court believed that Twitter’s core business would be crushed
absent the protections of the CDA in this case.
A policy holding Twitter liable for allowing ISIS to use
its services would require it to institute new procedures
and policies for screening and vetting accounts before
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they are opened; identify and suspend the accounts of
users posting pro-ISIS content; and even identify and
suspend the accounts of users promoting terrorism
through the direct messaging feature. These are not minor
obligations, as they would require Twitter to
fundamentally change certain aspects of its services and
overturn its hands-off content-neutral approach.
AER at 25. This is not true for the simple reason that the ATA has a scienter
requirement. If Twitter does not know or have reason to know that a terrorist
group is using its social network, it cannot be held liable. It is only in the unique
and limited scenario where an interactive computer service knowingly provides
material support to a designated terrorist group that liability would attach.
Accordingly, the view that liability in this case would destroy or fundamentally
change Twitter and other social networks is overblown.
Second, Congress enacted the CDA in order “to encourage interactive
computer services and users of such services to self-police the Internet for
obscenity and other offensive material. . . .” Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1028. The CDA
was enacted in large part in reaction to the decision in Stratton Oakmont, where the
court held that Prodigy could be held responsible for libelous statements posted on
one of its bulletin boards because it had proactively monitored that forum for
offensive content. 1995 WL 323710, at *1-4. But this is not a case that has
anything to do with Twitter’s efforts, or lack thereof, to edit or remove user
generated content. Nothing about this case would discourage “Good Samaritan”
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filtering of third party content. Indeed, it defies credulity that a section entitled
“Protection For ‘Good Samaritan’ Blocking And Screening Of Offensive Material”
would create immunity for the knowing provision of material support to a terrorist
organization. Such an interpretation of the CDA would expand that law far beyond
its narrow language and purpose. Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 852 (“[L]iability
would not discourage the core policy of section 230(c), ‘Good Samaritan’ filtering
of third party content.”).
II.

ISSUE 2: A THEORY OF LIABILITY BASED ON THE PROVISION
OF PRIVATE MESSAGING TOOLS TO A DESIGNATED
TERRORIST ORGANIZATION DOES NOT SEEK TO TREAT THE
DEFENDANT AS A “PUBLISHER” FOR PURPOSES OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)
In its November 18, 2016 Order, the District Court held that “[p]ublishing

activity under section 230(c)(1) extends to Twitter’s Direct Messaging
capabilities.” AER at 23. But Plaintiffs-Appellants’ theory of liability based on
Twitter’s provision of Direct Messaging capabilities to ISIS is not barred by the
CDA because Direct Messages are entirely private and not published. The District
Court’s interpretation of “publisher” conflicts with the ordinary meaning of that
word and was thus improper.
The CDA states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). The statute,
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however, does not define the term “publisher” and so that word must be given its
ordinary meaning. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 876 (2014) (“It is a
‘fundamental canon of statutory construction’ that, ‘unless otherwise defined,
words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning.’”) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)); Sebelius v.
Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1893 (2013) (“As in any statutory construction case, ‘[w]e
start, of course, with the statutory text,’ and proceed from the understanding that
‘[u]nless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance
with their ordinary meaning.’”) (quoting BP America Production Co. v. Burton,
549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006)); Cheffins v. Stewart, 825 F.3d 588, 594 (9th Cir. 2016)
(“We adopt the ‘common practice of consulting dictionary definitions’ to clarify
the ‘ordinary meaning’ of terms used in a statute but not defined therein.”) (citing
Johnson v. Aljian, 490 F.3d 778, 780 (9th Cir. 2007)); In re Online DVD-Rental
Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 914, 927 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Because this language is not
defined in the statute, we apply its ordinary meaning.”) (quotation omitted); Chubb
Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 2013) (“We
apply the fundamental precept of statutory construction that, unless otherwise
defined, ‘words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary,
common meaning.’”) (quoting Perrin).
The ordinary meaning of “publisher” is one who disseminates information to
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the public. Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(“Although the [CDA] does not define ‘publisher,’ its ordinary meaning is ‘one
that makes public,’ and ‘the reproducer of a work intended for public
consumption.’”) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1837
(1981)); Publish Definition, merriam-webster.com, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/publish (last visited Mar. 31, 2017) (“to disseminate to the
public”); Publish Definition, Dictionary.com, http://www.dictionary.com/
browse/publish (last visited Mar. 31, 2017) (“to issue . . . for sale or distribution to
the public”; “to issue publicly the work of”; “to make publicly or generally
known”); Publish Definition, Black’s Law Dictionary (2d Pocket Ed.) (“To
distribute copies (of a work) to the public.”). Accordingly, the CDA does not
apply to claims based on purely private communications, including claims based
on ISIS’s use of Twitter’s direct messages.
Despite all this, the District Court applied the definition of “publish” used in
defamation law—communication of defamatory matter to one other than the
person defamed—because “Congress enacted section 230(c)(1) in part to respond
to a New York state court decision finding that an internet service provider could
be held liable for defamation based on third-party content posted on its messages
boards.” AER at 23. But the legislative history behind the CDA is irrelevant in
interpreting the term “publisher” because there is no ambiguity in the plain
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language of the statute. Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189,
194 (1985) (“Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by
Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately
expresses the legislative purpose.”); Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63,
68 (1982) (In determining the plain meaning of statutory language, the court must
“assume ‘that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the
words used.’”) (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)).
While courts have noted that the CDA was enacted in reaction to the
decision in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), where an internet service provider could be liable for
defamation, Congress did not define “publisher” according to its use in defamation
law. Had Congress wanted to incorporate such a definition into the CDA, it surely
knew how to do so. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461–62 (2002)
(“We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in
a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”); Bauer v. MRAG
Americas, Inc., 624 F.3d 1210, 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) (same). 2 As the Ninth Circuit
has repeatedly warned about the CDA in particular, “we must be careful not
exceed the scope of the immunity provided by Congress. Congress could have
written the statute more broadly, but it did not.” Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 853
2

Indeed, the CDA itself contains a definition section. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f).
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(quoting Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164
n.15 (9th Cir. 2008)).
In support of its reliance on the CDA’s legislative history, the District Court
pointed to language from Barnes:
While plaintiffs insist that reference to the legislative
history is improper and that “publisher” must be given its
normal, ordinary meaning, - “to make public” - the Ninth
Circuit has already indicated that section 230(c)(1)
extends at least as far as prohibiting internet service
providers from being treated as publishers for the
purposes of defamation liability. Barnes, 570 F.3d at
1101 (the language of the statute does not limit its
application to defamation cases) (emphasis added). In
response to this, plaintiffs assert that “even if Congress
had intended that the defamation definition of ‘publisher’
be applied in defamation cases, it makes no sense to
apply that definition outside of the context of defamation
claims.” Oppo. at 8. But this is contradicted by the
Ninth Circuit’s statement that “sections 230(c)(1)
precludes courts from treating internet service providers
as publishers not just for the purposes of defamation law .
. . but in general.” Id.
AER at 23 (original emphasis). Respectfully, the District Court misreads the
holding of Barnes. Barnes indeed states that the application of the CDA is not
limited to defamation cases; Plaintiffs-Appellants make no contention to the
contrary. But Barnes says nothing about how to define “publisher” for purposes of
the CDA. The District Court’s reading of Barnes does not find support in the text
of that decision. While the CDA applies outside of the defamation context, it does
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not follow that the definition of “publish” used in defamation cases should apply to
the CDA.
The District Court also relied on the fact that “a number of courts have
applied the CDA to bar claims predicated on a defendant’s transmission of
nonpublic messages, and have done so without questioning whether the CDA
applies in such circumstances.” AER at 24. But as the District Court notes, none
of these cases actually addressed whether the CDA applies to non-published
private communications. That these courts failed to address the issue is not
indicative of how they would have decided it, only that the argument was not
presented.
In any event, even if Congress intended that defamation definition of
“publisher” apply in defamation cases, it makes little sense to use that definition in
other contexts. Here, Plaintiffs-Appellants are not seeking to hold DefendantAppellee liable for the dissemination defamatory material. The ATA has nothing
to do with defamation and there is no reason that a definition strictly confined to
that area of law should apply to a statute like the ATA designed to prevent the
provision of material support to terrorists. Moreover, the threat of the decision in
the Stratton Oakmont case was that it potentially opened up interactive computer
services to tremendous liability due to their outsized readership. Zeran v. Am.
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Interactive computer services
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have millions of users. . . . The specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific
speech would have an obvious chilling effect.”). Liability for private
communications present no such threat.
III.

ISSUE 3: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY ALLEGE
PROXIMATE CAUSATION
In its November 18, 2016 Order, the District Court held that “the allegations

in the SAC do not support a plausible inference of proximate causation between
Twitter’s provision of accounts to ISIS and the death of Fields and Creach”
because Plaintiffs-Appellants did not allege that the “attack was in any way
impacted, helped by, or the results of ISIS’s presence on the social network.” AER
at 21. Respectfully, the District Court is wrong on the law and misstates PlaintiffsAppellants’ allegations.
Proximate causation is established under the ATA when a defendant’s “acts
were a substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation,” and the injury
at issue “was reasonably foreseeable or anticipated as a natural consequence.”3
Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Lerner v. Fleet
Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 123 (2d Cir. 2003)); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 97 F.

3

Notably, the ATA does not require but-for causation. Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC,
97 F. Supp. 3d 287, 323 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“As the only cases to directly address
the issue have held, requiring ‘but for’ causation would effectively annul the civil
liability provisions of the ATA. That cannot have been the intent of Congress in
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Supp. 3d 287, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“The causation charge the Court gave focused
solely on whether defendant’s acts were a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs’
injuries, and whether such injuries were a foreseeable result of those acts.”). “A
proximate cause determination does not require a jury to identify the liable party as
the sole cause of harm; it only asks that the identified cause be a substantial factor
in bringing about the injury.” Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 508
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Gill I”) (quoting Hydro Investors, Inc. v. Trafalgar Power Inc.,
227 F.3d 8, 15 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Importantly, there is no “directness” requirement for proximate causation
under the ATA. Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287, 328 (E.D.N.Y.
2015) (“[P]roposed language [for the jury instructions] concerning the ‘directness’
of the relation between plaintiffs’ injury and defendant’s acts was inappropriate in
the ATA context.”). In cases involving the provision of financial support to
terrorist organizations, courts have refused to impose a “directness” requirement
for proximate causation under the ATA because money is fungible. See, e.g., Boim
v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 690-91 (7th Cir. 2008)
(“Boim III”) (“Because money is fungible, the combination of the link to Hamas
and the receipt of an amount that would have been sufficient to finance the

enacting them.”); Gill v. Arab Bank, PLC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 474, 507 (E.D.N.Y.
2012) (“‘But for’ cause cannot be required in the section 2333(a) context.”).
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shooting at the Beit El bus stop would be enough to show that the ‘material
assistance’ of giving money caused the terrorist act that took David Boim’s life.”)
(Posner, J.); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 925 F. Supp. 2d 414, 433-34
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[P]laintiffs who bring an ATA action are not required to trace
specific dollars to specific attacks to satisfy the proximate cause standard. Such a
task would be impossible and would make the ATA practically dead letter because
‘[m]oney is fungible.’”) (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1,
30 (2010)); Gill I, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (“The money used need not be shown to
have been used to purchase the bullet that struck the plaintiff. A contribution, if
not used directly, arguably would be used indirectly by substituting it for money in
[ISIS’s] treasury. . . .”).
But fungibility is not limited to financial support. As the Supreme Court has
noted, non-financial forms of material support to terrorists are just as fungible. In
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010), plaintiffs sought a
preliminary injunction because they wished to provide legal and political advocacy
training to designated terrorist organizations, but feared that they would be
prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B for providing material support to FTOs. Id. at
10. The Supreme Court considered “whether the Government may prohibit” the
provision of “material support to [terrorists] in the form of speech,” and focused on
whether a ban on the kind of material support at issue was necessary to further the
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Government’s interest in combatting terrorism. Id. at 28. The Supreme Court,
following the lead of Congress, determined that “foreign organizations that engage
in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to
such an organization facilitates that conduct.” Id. at 29 (quoting Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), § 301(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1247, note
following 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Findings and Purpose)) (original emphasis). The
court likewise deferred to the expertise of the State Department which found that
“all contributions to foreign terrorist organizations further their terrorism,” and that
“it is highly likely that any material support to these organizations will ultimately
inure to the benefit of their criminal, terrorist functions—regardless of whether
such support was ostensibly intended to support non-violent, non-terrorist
activities.” Id. at 33.
“Material support,” the court reasoned, “is a valuable resource by
definition.” Id. at 30.
Such support frees up other resources within the
organization that may be put to violent ends. It also
importantly helps lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist
groups—legitimacy that makes it easier for those groups
to persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds—all of
which facilitate more terrorist attacks. . . . Indeed, some
designated foreign terrorist organizations use social and
political components to recruit personnel to carry out
terrorist operations, and to provide support to criminal
terrorists and their families in aid of such operations.
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Id. at 30-31 (quotation marks omitted). It is thus unsurprising that the ATA’s
material support statutes prohibit not only providing money to terrorist groups, but
also “any property, tangible or intangible, or service,” including “communications
equipment.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1). “The material-support statute is, on its
face, a preventive measure—it criminalizes not terrorist attacks themselves, but aid
that makes the attacks more likely to occur.” Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S.
at 35.
Here, the District Court’s analysis ran afoul of this established case law.
First, the District Court improperly sought to impose a directness requirement even
though courts have uniformly found that there is no such requirement under the
ATA:
Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts linking Twitter’s
provision of accounts to ISIS to Abu Zaid’s attack.
Instead they assert that they have demonstrated
proximate cause by alleging that Twitter provided ISIS
with material support in the form of a powerful
communication tool and that ISIS has claimed
responsibility for Abu Zaid’s actions. These allegations
do not plausibly suggest the necessary causal connection
between Twitter’s provision of accounts and the attack
that killed Lloyd Fields, Jr. and James Damon Creach.
AER at 22. As many courts have found, proximate causation under the ATA is
satisfied where a defendant provides material support to a terrorist organization
and that organization soon thereafter carries out a terrorist act. Linde, 97 F. Supp.
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3d at 328; Boim III, 549 F.3d at 690-91; Strauss, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 433-34.
Whether the support comes in the form of cash or equipment or services does not
matter; such support is fungible and permits the terrorist organization to carry out
further attacks.
In this case, Plaintiffs-Appellants adequately pled proximate causation
because they alleged that: (1) Twitter provided material support to ISIS, and (2)
ISIS soon thereafter carried out the attack in which Lloyd Fields, Jr. and James
Damon Creach were killed. AER at 33-42. The importance of the accounts that
Twitter provided to ISIS cannot be overstated. ISIS used Twitter to recruit
numerous operatives across the globe, to raise millions of dollars for carrying out
its terrorist operations and for spreading its propaganda. Id. at 33-38. Indeed,
“[w]ithout Twitter, the explosive growth of ISIS over the last few years into the
most-feared terrorist group in the world would not have been possible.” Id. at 33.
According to the District Court, this is not enough because Plaintiffs-Appellants
did not tie Twitter’s provision of accounts to ISIS directly to the attack at issue.
But this is precisely the kind of directness requirement that courts have rejected.
The District Court’s decision is also based in part on the belief that, under a
fungibility conception of material support, “any plaintiff could hold Twitter liable
for any ISIS-related injury without alleging any connection between a particular
terrorist act and Twitter’s provision of accounts.” AER at 29. This is not so. As
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Judge Posner has noted, “[t]errorism campaigns often last for many decades” and
“[s]eed money for terrorism can sprout acts of violence long after the investment.”
Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. (“Boim III”), 549 F.3d 685, 701 (7th
Cir. 2008). But this does not mean that Twitter would be liable for every terrorist
act that ISIS carries out. Rather, liability under the ATA is inherently limited by
the importance of the material support provided and its temporal proximity to the
attack(s) at issue:
Thus, a major recent contribution with a malign state of
mind would—and should—be enough . . .[b]ut a small
contribution made long before the event—even if
recklessly made—would not be. The concept of
proximate cause is central in imposing a balance. . . .
Temporal and factual issues will often be crucial, in
particular cases, in proximate cause inquiries pursuant to
section 2333(a).
Gill I, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (Weinstein, J.). Here, as noted above, the provision
of Twitter accounts to ISIS had a major impact on the recruiting and fundraising of
that terrorist organization and allowed it to carry out a shockingly large number of
terrorist attacks. And Twitter’s provision of accounts to ISIS coincides precisely
with the rise of that organization and the attack that killed Mr. Fields and Mr.
Creach.
In support of its interpretation of the proximate causation standard under the
ATA, the District Court relied on two Second Circuit cases. First, the District
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Court cited to In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2011, 714 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir.
2013) for the proposition that “routine banking services” cannot establish
proximate causation. But the application of that rule to this case is mistaken. The
Second Circuit’s ruling in In re Terrorist Attacks is based on the view that terrorist
attacks are not reasonably foreseeable results of “routine banking services”
because there is no reason to know that such services would be misused. 4 Here,
however, Plaintiffs-Appellants alleged that Twitter knowingly provided material
support to ISIS. There is nothing routine about the knowing provision of material
support to terrorists and it is entirely foreseeable that such conduct would likely
result in future terrorist attacks. This case is thus on similar footing to Arab Bank:
Nothing in the amended complaints suggests that Arab
Bank is a mere unknowing conduit for the unlawful acts
of others, about whose aims the Bank is ignorant. Given
plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the knowing and
intentional nature of the Bank’s activities, there is
nothing “routine” about the services the Bank is alleged
to have provided. Thus, plaintiffs’ allegations with
respect to Arab Bank’s knowledge and conduct are
sufficient under their first factual theory.
Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). Likewise,
in Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010), the court

4

Indeed, the Second Circuit’s reference to “routine banking services” appears to
originate from Licci v. Am. Exp. Bank Ltd., 704 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410-11 (S.D.N.Y.
2010), in which the court held that it was not “reasonably foreseeable that the
routine banking services performed by Amex Bank would result in the death and
bodily injuries suffered by plaintiffs in rocket attacks launched at Israel.”
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acknowledged that the knowing provision of services to a designated terrorist
organization is not routine:
Plaintiffs have alleged that BOC provided financial
services to a terrorist organization despite knowing those
services would facilitate the PIJ’s acts of terrorism
against Israeli and American citizens. . . . The banking
services allegedly provided by BOC to the PIJ are,
therefore, by no means the routine sort of services
provided by the correspondent bank to the Lebanese
bank.
Id. at 66. Because Plaintiffs-Appellants have alleged that Twitter knowingly
provided ISIS with accounts, In re Terrorist Attacks does not apply.
Second, the District Court cited Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 96 (2d
Cir. 2013) for the proposition that proximate causation under the ATA cannot be
established without a direct causal link because such a standard “would mean that
any provider of U.S. currency to a state sponsor of terrorism would be strictly
liable for injuries subsequently caused by a terrorist organization associated with
that state.” AER at 22. But the Rothstein court was specifically addressing
whether UBS’s violation of federal law created per se liability. In that case, while
UBS had illegally furnished U.S. currency to Iran, there was no allegation that
UBS had provided funds directly to Hizbollah, the terrorist group that injured the
plaintiffs. The allegations here are not similarly attenuated. Plaintiffs-Appellants
allege that Twitter provided material support directly to ISIS, not through an
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intermediary. They are not arguing that Twitter’s violation of the ATA’s criminal
provisions creates per se liability, but rather that the tools that Twitter provided
were so valuable to ISIS that it enabled ISIS to carry out numerous terrorist
attacks, including the attack that killed Mr. Fields and Mr. Creach. In addition,
Plaintiffs-Appellants are not seeking to impose “strict liability”; they allege that
Twitter acted knowingly and/or recklessly.
CONCLUSION
(Fed. R. App. P. 28)
For the reasons stated above, this Court should reverse the District Court’s
Order and Judgment granting Twitter’s motion to dismiss.
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STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
(Ninth Circuit Rule 28-2.6)
Plaintiffs-Appellants are not aware of any related cases pending in this

Court.
Dated: March 31, 2017

Respectfully submitted,
BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.
s/ L. Timothy Fisher
L. Timothy Fisher
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